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OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
At the heart of this appeal is whether the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands retains concurrent jurisdiction over local 
Virgin Islands crimes when the federal crimes giving rise to 
that jurisdiction are dismissed midtrial.  Ronald Edward 
Gillette was tried in the District Court for failing to register as 
a sex offender in violation of federal law, and for numerous 
counts of aggravated rape and unlawful sexual contact in 
violation of Virgin Islands law.  After the Government rested 
its case, the District Court dismissed the federal charges but 
proceeded to verdict on the local charges, with Gillette being 
found guilty of those charges.  Gillette appeals his conviction, 
contending the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
local crimes.  We hold that, under these circumstances, the 
District Court retained concurrent jurisdiction over the local 
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crimes notwithstanding its dismissal of the federal charges.  
Gillette also challenges several aspects of his trial and 
sentence.  Finding no error, we will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
In the spring of 2007, the U.S. Marshal Service for the 
District of the Virgin Islands received a tip that Gillette, an 
unregistered sex offender, might be residing in St. Croix.  
Believing that Gillette was required to register with local 
officials as a consequence of his 1983 conviction in New 
Mexico for Criminal Sexual Penetration and Contributing to 
the Delinquency of a Minor—crimes for which Gillette 
served eighteen years of a twenty-seven year sentence in 
prison—law enforcement authorities followed up on the lead.  
They discovered that, indeed, Gillette had not registered as a 
sex offender, and, further, that he was living in St. Croix with 
a teenage boy.   
 
The authorities went to arrest Gillette at his apartment 
on charges of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation 
of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., and failure to register 
as a sex offender within ten days of establishing residency in 
a state other than the state within which he was convicted, in 
violation of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (the 
“Wetterling Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 14072(g)(3) (repealed 2009).  
When Gillette was arrested, the authorities found him with 
M.B., a fifteen-year-old boy.  Upon interviewing M.B., the 
authorities learned that he had been living with Gillette since 
he was approximately twelve years old, and that the two had 
been sexually involved during that time.  The authorities later 
4 
 
learned that Gillette had also victimized another minor boy, 
M.B.’s younger cousin, A.A..  
 
On October 15, 2007, a federal grand jury handed 
down a thirty-count superseding indictment charging Gillette 
with numerous crimes related to his failure to register as a sex 
offender and his unlawful sexual contact with M.B. and A.A..  
Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment alleged violations of the 
U.S. Code related to Gillette’s failure to register as a sex 
offender.
1
  The remaining counts alleged violations of the 
Virgin Islands Code.
2
  Both the federal and local charges 
                                              
1
 Count 1 charged Gillette with failure to register as a 
sex offender in violation of SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); 
Count 2 charged him with failure to register as a sex offender 
within ten days of establishing residency in the Virgin Islands 
in violation of the Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14072(g)(3) 
and (i). 
  
2
 Count 3 charged Gillette with Aggravated Rape in 
the First Degree in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit.14, §§ 
1700(a)(1) and (a)(2)(c); Count 4 charged him with Unlawful 
Sexual Contact in the First Degree in violation of V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14 § 1708(2); Counts 5 through 11 charged him with 
Aggravated Rape in the First Degree in violation of V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1700(a)(2); Counts 12 through 18 charged 
him with Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit.14, § 1708(3); Counts 19 
through 23 charged him with Aggravated Rape in the Second 
Degree in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit.14, § 1700a(a); 
Counts 24 through 28 charged him with Unlawful Sexual 
Contact in the Second Degree in violation of V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 14, § 1709; and Counts 29 and 30 charged him with 
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were brought in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  The 
District Court exercised jurisdiction over the local crimes 
pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), which grants the District 
Court concurrent jurisdiction with the Virgin Islands courts 
over certain local crimes “which are of the same or similar 
character or part of, or based on, the same act or transaction” 
that constitutes a violation of federal law.  48 U.S.C. § 
1612(c). 
 
The Magistrate Judge presided over the initial 
proceedings against Gillette.  After difficulties arose between 
Gillette and his first court-appointed attorney, Gillette moved 
for substitution of counsel.  The Magistrate Judge granted 
Gillette’s motion, and appointed Eszart Wynter to represent 
Gillette.  
 
Wynter became concerned Gillette might be 
incompetent to stand trial, and on September 19, 2007, he 
moved for a psychological evaluation.  The Magistrate Judge 
granted the request, and a forensic psychologist evaluated 
Gillette.  The psychologist concluded Gillette was competent, 
notwithstanding a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, because 
Gillette demonstrated an understanding of the nature and 
consequences of the charges against him, as well as an ability 
to assist in his own defense.  After receiving the competency 
report, Gillette did not request a competency hearing, and the 
Magistrate Judge did not order one sua sponte.  Thereafter, 
neither Gillette, the Magistrate Judge, nor the District Court 
revisited the issue of Gillette’s competency. 
                                                                                                     
Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree in violation of 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1708(5).   
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Before the trial commenced, Gillette filed a motion to 
dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, arguing that he was 
not obligated to register under either SORNA or the 
Wetterling Act.  First, Gillette argued that he did not meet the 
requirements of SORNA set out at 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) 
because that statute requires interstate travel in addition to 
failure to register, see § 2250(a)(2)(B), and he had not 
traveled across state lines since SORNA became effective on 
July 27, 2006.
3
  Second, Gillette argued that the Wetterling 
                                              
3
 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) provides that: 
 
(a) In general.--Whoever  
(1) is required to register 
under the Sex Offender 
Registration and 
Notification Act; 
(2)(A) is a sex offender as 
defined for the purposes of 
the Sex Offender 
Registration and 
Notification Act by reason 
of a conviction under 
Federal law (including the 
Uniform Code of Military 
Justice), the law of the 
District of Columbia, 
Indian tribal law, or the 
law of any territory or 
possession of the United 
States; or 
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Act did not apply to him because it only required individuals 
to register with the FBI if they lived in a state that had “not 
established a minimally sufficient sexual offender registration 
program,” see 42 U.S.C. § 14072(c), and, he argued, the 
Virgin Islands registration program qualified as a minimally 
sufficient registration program that did not require him to 
register.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1722. 
 
The District Court denied Gillette’s motion to dismiss 
Count 2, finding that he was subject to the Wetterling Act’s 
registration requirements.  As to Count 1, the District Court 
ordered the Government to produce evidence that Gillette had 
traveled interstate after SORNA’s passage.  The Government 
responded that it had “no evidence tending to indicate post 
2003 interstate travel of the defendant.”  (Joint Appendix 
[“J.A.”] 0210.)  Despite the Government’s response, the 
District Court denied Gillette’s motion as to Count 1 as well, 
deeming it “premature to find the fact that Gillette has not 
                                                                                                     
(B) travels in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or 
enters or leaves, or resides 
in, Indian country; and  
(3) knowingly fails to 
register or update a 
registration as required by 
the Sex Offender 
Registration and 
Notification Act;  
shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both. 
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traveled in interstate commerce after July 27, 2006 without 
hearing the evidence at trial.”  (J.A. 0008.) 
 
The District Court conducted a bench trial on all 
charges.  After the Government rested its case in chief, 
Gillette moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  The District Court granted 
the motion as to Count 1 due to the absence of evidence of 
interstate travel by Gillette after SORNA’s effective date.  
The District Court also dismissed Count 2, finding that 
Gillette’s failure to register as a sex offender after relocating 
to the Virgin Islands did not violate the Wetterling Act 
because the Virgin Islands is not a “State” as contemplated by 
the statute.
4
  (J.A. 0218.)  The District Court, however, 
refused to dismiss the remaining local charges. 
 
The District Court ultimately found Gillette guilty of 
Counts 3 through 18, 22, 23, 27, and 28.  On June 19, 2009, 
the District Court sentenced Gillette to 15 years imprisonment 
on Counts 3 through 11 (Counts 12 through 18 merged with 
Counts 5 through 11), 10 years on Counts 22 and 23, and 1 
year on Counts 27 and 28, with the prison term on Counts 27 
and 28 to run concurrently to the prison terms on Counts 22 
and 23, respectively, and the remainder to run consecutively, 
for a total sentence of 155 years.  The District Court also 
                                              
4
  The Wetterling Act provided, in pertinent part, that 
any person required to register as a sex offender, “who 
changes address to a State other than the State in which the 
person resided at the time of the immediately preceding 
registration shall, not later than 10 days after that person 
establishes a new residence, register a current address . . . .”  
42 U.S.C. § 14072(g)(3). 
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imposed a fine of $50,000 and restitution in the amount of 
$220,000 ($110,000 each for M.B. and A.A.).  Gillette filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  We must decide 
whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the counts of 
conviction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c).  We exercise 
plenary review over the question of whether the District Court 
had jurisdiction.  Solis v. Local 234, Transp. Workers Union, 
585 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
1. 
 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands derives its 
jurisdiction from Article IV, § 3 of the United States 
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate the 
territories of the United States.  Parrot v. Gov’t of V.I., 230 
F.3d 615, 622-23 (3d Cir. 2000).  This distinguishes it from 
other federal courts, whose jurisdiction is grounded in Article 
III.  Id. at 623.  Because Congress establishes the scope of the 
Virgin Islands District Court’s jurisdiction by statute, we 
must determine whether § 1612(c) was intended to confer on 
the District Court the authority to adjudicate charges of local 
crimes when the related federal counts are dismissed. 
 
Congress enacted § 1612(c) as part of its 1984 
amendments to the Revised Organic Act of 1954 (“the 
Revised Organic Act”), 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1645.  See 48 
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U.S.C. §§ 1611-1615 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000) (codifying 
1984 amendments).  Prior to the 1984 amendments, the 
District Court exercised broad jurisdiction over Virgin Islands 
crimes pursuant to the Revised Organic Act, which vested the 
District Court with jurisdiction over all matters arising under 
local Virgin Islands law, except civil cases in which the 
amount in controversy was less than $500 and criminal cases 
in which the maximum punishment did not exceed six months 
in prison or a $100 fine.  Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, 68 
Stat. 506 (1954); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 630 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Under this framework, the District Court was 
“more like a state court of general jurisdiction than a United 
States district court.”  Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 
1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982).
5
 
 
Three decades later, Congress passed the 1984 
amendments to the Revised Organic Act in an effort to 
“establish[] the framework for a dual system of local and 
federal judicial review.”  Parrott, 230 F.3d at 619; 48 U.S.C. 
§§ 1611-1616 (codifying amendments).  Seeking to put an 
end to the “situation of both the district court and the local 
court having jurisdiction over strictly local causes,”  130 
Cong. Rec. S. 23789 (Aug. 10, 1984),  Congress provided the 
Virgin Islands legislature with a mechanism to divest the 
District Court of jurisdiction over cases arising under Virgin 
Islands law.
6
  See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b), 1612(b).  In doing 
                                              
5
  We have thoroughly examined the evolution of the 
Virgin Islands District Court’s jurisdiction in prior decisions.  
See, e.g., Parrott, 231 F.3d at 619 n.3; Carty, 679 F.2d at 
1053-57; United States v. George, 625 F.2d 1081, 1087-88 
(3d Cir. 1980).  
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so, however, Congress specifically provided that the District 
Court would retain concurrent jurisdiction over charges 
alleging local crimes that are related to federal crimes.  See 48 
U.S.C. § 1612(c).  Accordingly, when the Virgin Islands 
legislature vested original jurisdiction over local criminal 
actions in the local courts of the Virgin Islands, the District 
Court retained concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to § 1612(c). 
 
 One of the explicit purposes in creating the concurrent 
jurisdiction statute was “to obviate the need for trying in 
different courts separate aspects of the same offense or of 
closely related offenses.”  130 Cong. Rec. S. 23789 (Aug. 10, 
1984).  To that end, 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c) provides: 
 
The District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the courts of the 
Virgin Islands established by local 
law over those offenses against 
the criminal laws of the Virgin 
Islands, whether felonies or 
misdemeanors or both, which are 
of the same or similar character or 
                                                                                                     
6
 The Virgin Islands legislature vested original 
jurisdiction in its local courts effective January 1, 1994.  See 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 76(b).  At that time, the local court 
was known as the Territorial Court.  On September 30, 2004, 
however, the Virgin Islands legislature passed Bill No. 25-
0213, renaming the Territorial Court the Superior Court of the 
Virgin Islands, effective October 20, 2004.  Pichardo v. V.I. 
Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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part of, or based on, the same act 
or transaction or two or more acts 
or transactions connected together 
or constituting part of a common 
scheme or plan, if such act or 
transaction or acts or transactions 
also constitutes or constitute an 
offense or offenses against one or 
more of the statutes over which 
the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands has jurisdiction . . . .   
 
Id.  Here, the parties do not dispute that Gillette’s federal and 
local charges were sufficiently related to trigger concurrent 
jurisdiction under § 1612(c).  Gillette maintains, however, 
that the District Court’s dismissal of the federal charges 
deprived it of jurisdiction over the local charges.  
 
2. 
 
 Gillette asserts that “if the actions which create 
liability under Virgin Islands local law do not create criminal 
liability under federal law, then the District Court lacks 
concurrent jurisdiction.”  (Reply Br. 3.)  Gillette’s argument 
is based on the text of § 1612(c), which grants concurrent 
jurisdiction where violations of local law also “constitute an 
offense or offenses” against federal law.  48 U.S.C. § 1612(c).   
 
 Section 1612(c), however, does not condition the 
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over local charges on 
whether the related federal offenses are proven.  Indeed, 
unlike the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia in criminal cases, 
13 
 
see D.C. Code § 11-502(3), or the civil supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, section 1612(c) does 
not even require that a sufficiently related federal offense be 
included in the indictment in order for the District Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the local charges.
7
  Instead, all that 
                                              
7
 D.C. Code § 11-502 provides: 
 
In addition to its jurisdiction as a 
United States district court and 
any other jurisdiction conferred 
on it by law, the United States 
District Court for the District of 
Columbia has jurisdiction of the 
following: 
. . . .  
(3) Any offense under any law 
applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia which 
offense is joined in the same 
indictment with any Federal 
offense.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
[I]n any civil action of which the 
district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts 
shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the 
action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of 
14 
 
is required is that there be a sufficient nexus between the local 
charges and “an offense or offenses against one or more of 
the statutes over which the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands has jurisdiction. . . .”  48 U.S.C. § 1612(c).  Gillette’s 
concession that there was the requisite nexus between the 
local crimes and the federal offenses that were charged is 
sufficient to end the jurisdictional inquiry, notwithstanding 
the dismissal of the federal charges. 
 
 Even if joinder of a federal offense in the instrument 
charging local crimes was required for exercise of concurrent 
jurisdiction under § 1612(c), the subsequent dismissal of 
federal charges does not impact the District Court’s 
concurrent jurisdiction.  Cf., United States v. Johnson, 46 
F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that under the 
District of Columbia Code the dismissal of federal charges 
did not deprive the District Court for the District of Columbia 
of jurisdiction over local charges).  The seminal case 
establishing that dismissal of properly joined federal charges 
does not divest the District Court for the District of Columbia 
of jurisdiction over local District of Columbia charges is 
                                                                                                     
the same case or controversy 
under Article II of the United 
States Constitution. . . .  
(Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, exercise of jurisdiction over claims or charges 
otherwise outside the authority of the district courts is 
conditioned upon the existence of a claim or charge 
over which the federal court has original jurisdiction.  
Section 1612(c) is not similarly phrased. 
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United States v. Shepard, 515 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  In 
Shepard, the appellant was indicted on charges of robbery of 
a federally insured state savings and loan association, in 
violation of the United States Code, and armed robbery, 
robbery, and assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
the District of Columbia Code.  Shepard, 515 F.2d at 1326-
27.  The appellant was tried before a jury in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, which exercised 
jurisdiction over the District of Columbia Charges under D.C. 
Code § 11-502.  Id.  Section 11-502 grants the District Court 
for the District of Columbia jurisdiction over “[a]ny offense 
under any law applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia which offense is joined in the same information or 
indictment with any Federal offense.”  D.C. Code § 11-
502(3).  Before the case was submitted to the jury, the 
government dismissed the federal offense –  robbery of a 
savings and loan association.  Shepard, 515 F.2d at 1327.  
The jury subsequently found the appellant guilty of armed 
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon.  Id. at 1328.  The 
appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that the district 
court’s jurisdiction over the District of Columbia Code 
offenses “lapsed when the federal count in the indictment was 
dismissed.”  Id.   
 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
disagreed, holding that “where federal and local offenses have 
been properly joined in one indictment and jeopardy has 
attached, the District Court may proceed to a determination of 
the local offenses regardless of any intervening disposition of 
the federal counts.”  Id. at 1331.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Shepard court looked to the civil law doctrine of 
supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over claims arising under state law if 
16 
 
those claims share “a common nucleus of operative fact” with 
claims arising under federal law.  United Mine Workers of 
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).  As the Shepard 
court noted, once a U.S. District Court has properly acquired 
supplemental jurisdiction, “it may determine all questions 
arising, irrespective of the disposition of the federal claim.”  
Shepard, 515 F.2d at 1330; see also Henglein v. Informal 
Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Emps., 974 
F.2d 391, 398 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is well settled that, after 
disposal of a federal claim, a district court has discretion to 
hear, dismiss, or remand a supplemental claim for which there 
is no independent basis for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.”).   
 
Using this doctrine as “a model for the resolution of 
[its] case,” the Shepard court observed that a goal of 
supplemental jurisdiction is to promote efficiency and 
conservation of judicial resources, and that this goal is 
particularly significant when a district court has received 
evidence on both claims prior to dismissal of the federal 
claims.  Shepard, 515 F.2d at 1330.  Similarly, the court 
reasoned, Congress’s goal in passing § 11-502(3) was to 
“minimize . . . the burdens on the courts and prosecution,” 
and this goal would be served “where an indictment charging 
offenses arising from a single factual situation [could] be tried 
in a single proceeding rather than in two proceedings in 
separate courts.”  Id. at 1330-31.  Given the “serious 
duplication of effort” that would result if the District Court 
for the District of Columbia were forced to relinquish 
jurisdiction over District of Columbia charges even after a 
trial commenced, the Shepard court concluded that mid-trial 
dismissal of federal charges did not divest the federal court of 
its jurisdiction.  Id. at 1331. 
17 
 
 
We are persuaded by Shepard’s reasoning.  Congress’s 
purpose in enacting 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c) was the same as its 
purpose in passing D.C. Code § 11-502(3): to prevent the 
need for multiple trials in different courts of “separate aspects 
of the same offense or of closely related offenses.”  130 
Cong. Rec. S. 23789 (Aug. 10, 1984).  Gillette’s 
interpretation of § 1612(c) would eviscerate this express 
congressional purpose.  Instead of conserving judicial 
resources by providing for one trial on all related counts, 
Gillette’s interpretation of § 1612(c) would force the 
government to either bring the charges in two different trials, 
or risk investing significant energy in proving local charges in 
the District Court, only to see them dismissed if it was 
unsuccessful in proving the federal charges.  Nothing in the 
legislative history nor the plain language of § 1612(c) 
supports the conclusion that Congress intended to make “the 
disposition of the local charges turn upon the strength of the 
Government’s case in support of the federal counts.”  See 
Shepard, 515 F.2d at 1329.  On the contrary, § 1612(c) does 
not make District Court jurisdiction depend on the existence 
of a federal charge.  It merely requires that the local charge be 
of the same or similar character as a federal crime over which 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction, or 
that the local charge be based upon acts or transactions that 
also constitute a federal offense.  As this requisite relationship 
concededly existed at the inception of the Gillette’s criminal 
case, the mid-trial disposition of the federal charges is simply 
irrelevant to the exercise of jurisdiction over the local 
charges.  
 
3. 
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Gillette, however, argues that the federal charges 
should not have made it to trial, asserting that the District 
Court should have dismissed them pursuant to his pre-trial 
motion to dismiss.  The premise of Gillette’s argument – that 
the motion to dismiss the federal charges should have been 
granted before trial – is unsound.8 
 
Gillette moved to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment on 
the basis that he had not traveled in interstate commerce after 
SORNA became effective.  Because interstate travel is a 
necessary element of that statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 
2250(a)(2)(b), he argued that applying SORNA to him would 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  After considering Gillette’s motion to dismiss 
Count 1, the District Court ordered the government to 
“represent to the Court when Gillette last traveled in interstate 
commerce.”  (J.A. 0209.)  The Government complied, 
explaining that it “ha[d] no evidence tending to indicate post 
2003 interstate travel . . . .”  (Id. 0210.)  Nevertheless, the 
District Court denied the motion without prejudice, 
“believ[ing] it to be premature to find the fact that Gillette 
ha[d] not traveled in interstate commerce after July 27, 2006, 
without hearing the evidence at trial.”  (Id. 0008.)   
 
 It is well-established that an indictment “is enough to 
call for a trial of the charge on the merits” so long as it is 
facially sufficient.  Huet, 665 F.3d at 594-95 (citing United 
States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2007)).  An 
indictment is facially sufficient if it:  
                                              
8
 Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions 
as to the motion to dismiss is plenary.  United States v. Huet, 
665 F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). 
19 
 
 
(1) contains the elements of the 
offense intended to be charged, 
(2) sufficiently apprises the 
defendant of what he must be 
prepared to meet, and (3) allows 
the defendant to show with 
accuracy to what extent he may 
plead a former acquittal or 
conviction in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution. 
 
Id. at 595 (quoting Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 321).  We have 
explained that, in general, “an indictment will satisfy these 
requirements where it informs the defendant of the statute he 
is charged with violating, lists the elements of a violation 
under the statute, and specifies the time period during which 
the violations occurred.”  Id.  Here, the indictment met each 
of these three requirements: it charged Gillette with failure to 
register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), 
it listed the elements of that statute—including the interstate 
travel element, alleged that Gillette violated each of the 
elements, and set forth a time period during which the alleged 
violations occurred.  Thus, the indictment was facially valid. 
 
 Gillette moved to dismiss Count 1 by arguing that the 
Government could not make out a necessary element of the 
charge.  However, our precedents make clear that a pretrial 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12(b)(3) “allows a district court to review the 
sufficiency of the government’s pleadings,” Huet, 665 F.3d at 
595 (emphasis added), but it is “not a permissible vehicle for 
addressing the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.”  Id. 
20 
 
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 
F.3d 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Indeed, a district court is 
prohibited from examining the sufficiency of the 
government’s evidence in a pretrial motion to dismiss 
because “[t]he government is entitled to marshal and present 
its evidence at trial, and have its sufficiency tested by a 
motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29.”  Id.  Thus, as we explained in Huet, a district 
court considering a pretrial motion to dismiss is “limited to 
determining whether, assuming all of [the facts alleged in the 
indictment] as true, a jury could find that the defendant 
committed the offense for which he was charged.”  Id. at 596.   
 
Gillette contends that the Government stipulated  
before trial that he had not traveled in interstate commerce 
after SORNA became effective.  We have suggested in past 
cases that there may be an exception to the general rule 
barring a court from addressing sufficiency of the evidence 
before trial where “there is a stipulated record.”  DeLaurentis, 
230 F.3d at 659.  However, as we noted in Huet, “we have 
never explicitly held that such an exception exists, much less 
defined its contours.”  Huet, 665 F.3d at 598 n.8.  We 
declined to define such an exception in Huet, and we also 
decline to do so now, particularly because the appeal before 
us does not present a stipulated record.  A stipulation is “[a] 
voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning the 
same relevant point.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1550 (9th ed. 
2009).  Here, there was no voluntary agreement between 
Gillette and the Government that he had not traveled 
interstate.  Instead, the Government answered truthfully that, 
at the time the District Court inquired pretrial, it could not 
come forward with evidence of that travel.  This 
representation did not strip the Government of its right to 
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“marshal and present its evidence at trial.”  Huet, 665 F.3d at 
595.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying 
Gillette’s pretrial motion to dismiss Count 1. 
 
Even if Count 1 should have been dismissed before 
trial, the District Court did not err in denying Gillette’s 
pretrial motion as to Count 2.  Gillette had argued that the 
Wetterling Act did not apply to him because the Virgin 
Islands sex offender registration law, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 
1722, allegedly did not require him to register.  The District 
Court was unpersuaded, finding that Gillette violated the 
Wetterling Act if he was required to register under New 
Mexico’s sexual offender program and later changed his 
residence to the Virgin Islands without registering with the 
Virgin Islands and the FBI.
9
 
 
 Although the District Court ultimately dismissed 
Count 2 midtrial, it did so on an entirely different basis.  The 
District Court dismissed Count 2 for failing to state an 
offense because the Court concluded that the Virgin Islands—
a territory of the United States—is not a State as 
contemplated by the Wetterling Act.
10
  The District Court 
raised this issue sua sponte, as Gillette did not assert it in 
either his pretrial motion or Rule 29 motion.
11
  Thus, the 
                                              
9
 For the text of the relevant portion of the Wetterling 
Act, see supra note 4.   
    
10
 We express no opinion as to the merits of the 
District Court’s interpretation of the Wetterling Act.   
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District Court committed no error by denying Gillette’s 
pretrial motion to dismiss Count 2 on a basis it found 
unpersuasive, and Gillette cannot claim error in the District 
Court’s failure to dismiss Count 2 before trial on a ground 
never presented by Gillette. 
 
Finally, Gillette’s contention that the District Court’s 
dismissal of the federal charges means that the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction is without merit.  Gillette’s 
argument conflates the grounds upon which the District Court 
dismissed Counts 1 and 2 with a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Neither insufficiency of the evidence nor failure 
to state an offense means that the charged conduct was 
outside the authority of the District Court to adjudicate.  
                                                                                                     
11
 In fact, Gillette’s attorney all but conceded that the 
Virgin Islands is a State within the meaning of the Wetterling 
Act, asserting at the Rule 29 hearing: 
 
I do not have an issue with 
the fact that the statute applies to 
the Virgin Islands by definition, 
and might have been intended by 
statute. 
 
 If I give – and if the Court 
finds that I’m wrong, I will be 
happy to accept that, okay, so I’m 
not conceding it, but as I said, I do 
not have a problem with that 
interpretation. . . . 
 
(J.A. 1104-05.) 
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Thus, the District Court’s dismissal of Counts 1 for 
insufficiency of the evidence and Count 2 for failure to state 
an offense has no bearing on the question of the District 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over those counts.  For this 
reason, we reject Gillette’s argument that the District Court 
could not have obtained concurrent jurisdiction over the local 
Virgin Islands charges because it lacked such jurisdiction 
over the federal charges at the inception of the case. 
 
B. Competency 
 
 Gillette argues that both the Magistrate Judge and the 
District Court erred by failing to hold a hearing to determine 
his competency, and that there is a reasonable probability that 
he was tried while incompetent.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s interpretation and application of the 
standards for determining competency, but we review for 
clear error a district court’s decision not to hold a competency 
hearing.  United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 241 (3d. Cir. 
1998). 
 
Due process prohibits the conviction of a legally 
incompetent person.  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 
(1966).  A defendant is legally incompetent if the defendant 
“lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings[,] . . . to consult with counsel, and to assist in 
preparing a defense.”  Leggett, 162 F.3d at 241 (quoting 
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)).   
 
The procedure for determining competency is set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which provides, in relevant part: 
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(a) Motion to determine 
competency of defendant.--
At any time after the 
commencement of a 
prosecution for an offense and 
prior to the sentencing of the 
defendant . . . the defendant or 
the attorney for the 
Government may file a motion 
for a hearing to determine the 
mental competency of the 
defendant.  The court shall 
grant the motion, or shall order 
such a hearing on its own 
motion, if there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be 
suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering 
him mentally incompetent to 
the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and 
consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to 
assist properly in his defense. 
 
(b) Psychiatric or psychological 
examination and report.--
Prior to the date of the 
hearing, the court may order 
that a psychiatric or 
psychological examination of 
the defendant be conducted, 
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and that a psychiatric or 
psychological report be filed 
with the court . . . . 
 
§ 4241.  As the text of § 4241 makes clear, a court must 
conduct a competency hearing if there is “reasonable cause” 
to believe the defendant is incompetent, whether or not either 
party requests it.   
 
 To determine whether such reasonable cause exists, a 
court must consider the unique circumstances of each case to 
decide if the defendant “(1) has the capacity to assist in her or 
his own defense and (2) comprehends the nature and possible 
consequences of trial.  If either prong is not met, a court has 
reasonable cause to order a competency hearing.”  United 
States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2003).  In making 
this determination, “a district court must consider a number of 
factors, including ‘evidence of a defendant’s irrational 
behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion 
on competence to stand trial.’”  Id. (citing Leggett, 162 F.3d 
at 242).   
 
  Gillette’s attorney made a motion requesting a 
competency evaluation on September 19, 2007.  The 
Magistrate Judge granted the request, and a forensic 
psychologist evaluated Gillette.  The psychologist concluded 
Gillette was competent to stand trial, explaining: 
 
While Mr. Gillette has been 
diagnosed with a thought 
disorder, Delusional Disorder 
should not be expected to 
significantly compromise his 
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perception or comprehension of 
reality related to his legal 
circumstances. . . .  He has 
demonstrated a rational and 
factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him, and 
sufficient ability to consult with 
his attorney with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding. . 
. .  Mr. Gillette is not currently 
suffering from a mental disease or 
defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent he is 
unable to understand the nature 
and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or 
properly assist in his defense. 
 
(J.A. 1621.)  After receiving the competency report, Gillette 
did not request a hearing on competency, and the District 
Court did not order one.   
 
 Gillette now contends it was error not to hold a hearing 
on competency, asserting that § 4241 “always contemplates 
that a competency hearing will be held where a court has 
ordered a psychological evaluation.”  (Appellant’s Br. 26.)  
He points to § 4241(b), which states that the court may order 
a psychiatric or psychological evaluation “[p]rior to the date 
of the hearing,” reasoning that this language assumes a 
hearing will be held where a competency evaluation is 
ordered.  Gillette also points to § 4241(a), which states that a 
court “shall” order a hearing.  Gillette fails to note, however, 
that the obligation to hold a competency hearing is triggered 
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only when a court finds that there is reasonable cause to doubt 
competency.  See § 4241(a) (“[T]he court shall grant the 
motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant [is 
incompetent].”) (emphasis added).  In addition, § 4241(b) 
discusses the court’s authority to order an evaluation after 
having already ordered a competency hearing.  In other 
words, the obligation to order a hearing is not triggered under 
§ 4241(a) unless the court has reasonable cause to doubt a 
defendant’s competency, and § 4241(b) does not apply unless 
a court has already ordered a hearing under § 4241(a).  
Moreover, nothing in the text of § 4241 prohibits a court from 
ordering a psychological evaluation without finding it has 
reasonable cause to doubt competency.  Thus, a district court 
errs in failing to hold a competency hearing only if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is incompetent. 
 
 After carefully examining the record, we hold that 
neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court clearly 
erred in failing to order a competency hearing.  Both judges 
had before them a report by a qualified medical professional 
concluding that, although Gillette suffered from Delusional 
Disorder, he was legally competent.  The psychologist’s 
conclusion comports with the behavior Gillette exhibited 
throughout the case, during which Gillette testified that he 
was employed by the CIA,
12
 suffered from a traumatic brain 
                                              
12
  Testifying before the Magistrate Judge on October 
1, 2007, Gillette stated that he had worked for the CIA since 
1974.  When questioned, he responded: “Before I answer 
your question, sir, I must ask that I be granted all rights, 
privileges, immunities and guarantees covered by me by the 
CIA and the White House.”  (J.A. 87.)   
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injury,
13
 was currently a semi-professional pool player,
14
 and 
was “disabled a hundred percent,”15  but nevertheless also 
                                                                                                     
 
13
 Gillette testified before the District Court that he 
suffered a traumatic brain injury while serving in the military 
in Vietnam.  When asked on direct examination what the 
effect of the brain injury was, Gillette responded:  
 
For example, we all at some time 
wake up in the morning.  We 
don’t know if it’s a, say a Tuesday 
or a Wednesday.  Well, not often, 
but at times, I will wake up and 
not even know the day.  I 
wouldn’t know Sunday, Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday, Saturday.  And I will have 
to take and go out to the computer 
and look at the computer to jog 
my memory. 
 
(J.A. 1237-38.) 
 
14
 Testifying to the activities he did with M.B., Gillette 
stated that he taught M.B. how to play pool, because he was 
“a semi-professional pool player.”  (J.A. 1252.) 
 
15
 Gillette testified that he was retired and “disabled a 
hundred percent” in response to questioning on direct 
examination about why he began helping M.B. with his 
homework.  Gillette’s testimony seems to have been intended 
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exhibited an ability to understand the charges against him and 
to assist in his defense.  Indeed, Gillette’s communications 
with his lawyer demonstrated that he understood the legal 
proceedings against him.  One note Gillette wrote to his 
counsel during trial explained “[b]ecause I might testify, she 
will bring up the 1983 conviction; therefore, you need to 
study three areas. . . .”  (S.A. 298.)  Furthermore, Gillette’s 
attorney made statements to the court indicating that Gillette 
was involved in preparing his defense.  Requesting that the 
court order the Bureau of Corrections to provide Gillette with 
reading glasses and writing materials, trial counsel explained 
“it gives him the opportunity to research, because this 
gentleman is not stupid to me, the things them (sic) he’s 
telling me, but he wants to research and verify certain things 
for himself.”  (S.A. 280-81.)  Taken as a whole, the record 
does not establish reasonable cause to believe Gillette was 
incompetent.  Therefore, we find that the District Court 
committed no error in failing to hold a competency hearing. 
 
C. Counsel’s Motions to Withdraw 
 
 Gillette next argues the Magistrate Judge and District 
Court erred by denying his trial counsel’s requests for 
withdrawal in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  This argument is unavailing.   
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants 
the right to appointed counsel, but that right is “not without 
limit and cannot be the justification for . . . manipulation of 
the appointment system.”  Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 
                                                                                                     
to explain why he had extra time in his schedule to get 
involved with M.B..  (J.A. 1254.) 
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145 (3d Cir. 2004).  A district court’s refusal to substitute 
counsel  is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995).  We have held 
that a district court abuses its discretion only if “good cause is 
shown for the defendant’s dissatisfaction with his current 
attorney.”  Id. (citing United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 
187 (3d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
have defined “good cause” as “a conflict of interest, a 
complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable 
conflict with an attorney.”  Id.  Relying on these cases, 
Gillette argues it was an abuse of discretion to deny Wynter’s 
motions to withdraw because, in his view, Wynter’s 
representation that “[a] breakdown in the attorney client 
relationship exist[ed],” constituted good cause for 
substitution.  (J.A. 0215.) 
 
 As an initial matter, we note that Gillette appeals the 
District Court’s denial of his attorney’s motions to withdraw, 
not the denial of any motion for substitution filed by Gillette 
himself.  Therefore, the case law Gillette cites does not neatly 
apply here.  Although Wynter testified at the February 4, 
2008 hearing that Gillette had asked him to withdraw, it is not 
clear that the remaining motions were filed at Gillette’s 
request.  However, even if we construe Wynter’s motions to 
withdraw as requests by Gillette for substitution of counsel, 
we conclude that neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District 
Court erred in determining that “good cause” for substitution 
was lacking.   
 
 Both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court made 
extensive inquiries into Wynter’s pretrial motions to 
withdraw.  The Magistrate Judge held a hearing after 
Wynter’s first motion, during which Gillette himself testified 
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at length.  In denying the motion for withdrawal, the 
Magistrate Judge expressed concern that Gillette was seeking 
to “manipulate the Court” and “frustrate the process,” by 
alleging that his lawyers were incompetent.  (S.A. 264-65.)  
He also observed that Gillette had already successfully 
received substitute counsel once.  Accordingly, he denied 
Wynter’s motion for withdrawal.  On March 17, 2008, the 
District Court presided over a subsequent withdrawal hearing, 
where Gillette again testified at length.  Gillette’s testimony 
at that hearing was equivocal, and at one point he stated that 
he “would have no objection” to further representation by 
Wynter provided he filed certain motions.  (S.A. 337.)   
 
 While it was clear at both hearings that the relationship 
between Gillette and Wynter was not without friction, it was 
also clear that the relationship had not suffered a complete 
breakdown requiring substitution of counsel.  In addition, 
Gillette had already substituted counsel once in the case, and 
both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court had reason to 
find that substitution would unduly delay the proceedings.  
Accordingly, we conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion in denying Wynter’s motions to withdraw. 
 
D. Reasonableness of Gillette’s Sentence 
 
 Gillette next argues his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable because the District Court “effectively 
sentence[ed him] to death,” without properly considering his 
age and history of mental illness.  (Appellant’s Br. 51.)  We 
are not persuaded. 
 
 Our review of the substantive reasonableness of a 
district court’s sentence is highly deferential, and we will 
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affirm “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Further, 
because Gillette did not object to the imposition of 
consecutive sentences at sentencing, “we review the matter 
only to assure that ‘plain error’ was not committed.”  United 
States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 1992).  Under either 
standard, we find the District Court’s sentence to be 
substantively reasonable. 
 
First, Gillette was convicted of several counts of both 
Aggravated Rape in the First Degree and Aggravated Rape in 
the Second Degree, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1700, 1700a, 
and the statutory maximum under both provisions is life 
imprisonment.
16
  Thus, the District Court had discretion to 
sentence Gillette to a term of life imprisonment under either 
statutory provision, even without imposing consecutive 
sentences. 
 
 Second, we agree with the District Court that its 
sentence served several purposes, including protecting the 
                                              
16
  Gillette was convicted of eight counts of 
Aggravated Rape in the First Degree, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 
1700, which provides that a person convicted under that 
statute “shall be imprisoned for life or for any term of years, 
but not less than fifteen years,”  and two counts of 
Aggravated Rape in the Second Degree, V.I. Code. Ann. tit. 
14, § 1700a(a), which provides that whoever is convicted 
under that provision “shall be imprisoned for life or for any 
term in years, but not less than 10 years.”   
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public and providing just punishment for the severity of 
Gillette’s crimes.  Explaining its sentence, the District Court 
stated: 
 
The acts of this defendant are 
morally repulsive.  He has in a 
very heinous and devious fashion 
violated two young boys in this 
territory.  This is Mr. Gillette’s 
second conviction involving 
sexually violating minors.  He 
served about twenty-seven years 
of incarceration,
17
 and again finds 
himself before us, this court 
system, for substantially the same 
offenses.  The sentence which I 
am about to impose will certainly 
reflect how serious these offenses 
are.  I hope they provide a respect 
for the law, and it’s a just 
punishment for the offenses for 
which he has been found guilty, 
and hope that they would provide 
deterrence from further crimes.  
And also protect the public from 
further crimes of this type. 
 
                                              
17
  The District Court appears to have been mistaken 
about the number of years Gillette was incarcerated.  The 
record indicates that he served eighteen years of incarceration 
for a twenty-seven year sentence.  (J.A. 0055, 1404.)  
34 
 
(J.A. 1556-57.)  As the District Court noted, Gillette was a 
repeat sexual offender who previously spent eighteen years in 
prison for his unlawful sexual contact with a minor in New 
Mexico only to move to the Virgin Islands and victimize two 
other children.  Given this history, the District Court 
reasonably determined that Gillette posed a continuing danger 
to the public.  Additionally, the District Court’s sentence 
properly reflects the seriousness and extent of the harm 
Gillette’s crimes caused to his victims.   
 
 Gillette contends the District Court failed to 
adequately explain its sentence, and erred by failing to 
discuss or account for Gillette’s age and history of mental 
illness.  We disagree.  As set forth above, the District Court 
adequately explained the reasons for its sentence, and we find 
the record abundantly supports the sentence.  Therefore, we 
will affirm the substantive reasonableness of the District 
Court’s sentence. 
 
E. Restitution 
 
 Finally, Gillette challenges the District Court’s 
restitution order.  He argues that he should not have been 
ordered to pay restitution because he was not convicted of a 
property crime; the expenses for which restitution was 
imposed are speculative; there is no record of his ability to 
pay restitution; and a reasonable payment schedule was not 
established.  We review the District Court’s imposition of 
restitution for plain error because Gillette did not challenge it 
at sentencing.  United States v. Hawes, 523 F.3d 245, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  
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The District Court ordered restitution pursuant to Title 
34, Section 203 of the Virgin Islands Code, which is 
commonly referred to as the “Victims’ and Witness’ Bill of 
Rights.”  Gillette’s argument that restitution is proper only in 
cases involving property crimes is foreclosed by this statute, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
 
A victim has a right to receive 
restitution for expenses or 
property loss incurred as a result 
of the crime.  The judge shall 
order restitution at every 
sentencing for a crime against 
person or property . . . unless the 
court finds a substantial and 
compelling reason not to order 
restitution. . . .  
 
34 V.I. Code Ann. § 203(d)(3).  This provision clearly states 
that restitution is proper for crimes “against person or 
property.”  Id. (emphasis added).   We therefore reject 
Gillette’s argument that restitution may only be ordered as 
punishment for property crimes. 
 
 We also reject Gillette’s argument that restitution in 
this case is inappropriate because calculation of the financial 
harm Gillette’s victims will likely suffer is speculative.  We 
have held that, in calculating restitution, courts “must point to 
the evidence in the record supporting the calculation of loss to 
the victims,” based on “specific findings regarding the factual 
issues.”  United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 356-57 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  The District Court satisfied this requirement, as 
the amount of restitution was based on itemized reports 
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prepared by a developmental and forensic pediatrician.  
Because the District Court’s restitution order was based on 
specific calculations of harm, it was not impermissibly 
speculative. 
 
 Gillette also argues the District Court should have 
conducted an inquiry into his ability to pay and established a 
reasonable payment schedule as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 
3663.  This provision of the United States Code, however, 
applies only to violations of federal law, and no similar 
Virgin Islands legislation exists.  To be sure, we have 
“strongly recommended” that the Virgin Islands District 
Court nevertheless conduct the type of inquiry set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3663 as “a better, if not essential, practice.”  Gov’t 
of V.I. v. Marsham, 293 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Indeed, in Marsham, we explicitly recommended an inquiry 
into the defendant’s ability to pay restitution, even though 18 
U.S.C. § 3663 no longer required it.  Id. at 119 n.5.  
Significantly, in recommending that the District Court 
conduct such an inquiry, we did so “with the full 
acknowledgement that although we deem this a most 
desirable practice, a failure to initiate such an inquiry does not 
at this stage constitute reversible error unless and until our 
Court so holds.”  Id. at 119.  Since we decided Marsham in 
2002, we have not held that failure to conduct this inquiry is 
mandated, and we do not hold so now.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the District Court did not plainly err in failing 
to assess Gillette’s ability to pay restitution or to establish a 
payment schedule. 
 
III. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
and sentence of the District Court. 
